We construct a theoretical model to capture the compensation and e¢ ciency e¤ects of globalization in a set up where the redistributive tax rate is chosen by the median voter. The model predicts that the two alternative modes of globalization-trade liberalization and …nancial openness-could potentially have di¤erent e¤ects on taxation. We then provide some empirical evidence on the relationship between taxation and the alternative modes of globalization using a large cross-country panel data set. On average, globalization is associated with lower taxation but there is some evidence that in countries with high capital-labor ratio, globalization is associated with increased taxation. We make a distinction between de jure and de facto measures of globalization and …nd a strong negative relationship between taxation and de jure measures of globalization. The results for de facto measures of globalization are mixed.
Introduction
There is a large literature studying the consequences of globalization for the welfare state. In an in ‡uential work, Rodrik (1997) highlights how increased capital mobility threatens the implicit contract between the government and the working class whereby the former o¤ers social insurance in exchange for greater globalization. Schulze and Ursprung (1999) provide a comprehensive survey of the early literature. They argue that the globalization debate with respect to …scal policy can be reduced to two e¤ects -an e¢ ciency e¤ect and a compensation e¤ect.
The e¢ ciency e¤ect refers to the fact that increased mobility of goods and factors of production will induce countries to lower taxes thereby lowering their ability to provide public goods. The compensation e¤ect refers to the fact globalization may increase demand for social insurance programs by increasing inequality as well as volatility. 2 This paper provides a theoretical model to formalize these o¤setting e¤ects in a uni…ed framework and empirically studies the relationship between globalization and taxation.
In the theoretical model, labor income is distributed equally but capital income is distributed unequally. The median voter decides on the level of redistributive taxation. Labor supply is endogenous, and therefore, taxation distorts labor supply which acts as a check on the extent of redistribution. With capital mobility, the possibility of capital ‡ight (or reduced capital in ‡ows) acts as a further check on taxation. While the tax competition literature assumes perfect capital mobility so that the post-tax returns to capital are equalized across countries, a key feature of our model is imperfect mobility of capital which allows us to do comparative statics with respect to the degree of capital mobility. In the absence of capital mobility, the impact of trade liberalization depends on whether the country is capital abundant or labor abundant. In a capital abundant country, trade liberalization increases the reward of capital and reduces the reward of labor thereby increasing inequality. Consequently, the level of redistributive taxation preferred by the median voter increases. The opposite happens in a labor abundant country. Things change with capital mobility. Given our assumption of source based taxation of returns to capital, in a capital exporting country increased capital mobility makes redistributive taxation more costly because it increases capital ‡ight. In a capital importing country, taxation of capital reduces capital in ‡ows, which reduces the tax base. Both these e¤ects tend to reduce taxation.
While the literature generally talks about the compensation and e¢ ciency e¤ects informally, our theoretical model formalizes these e¤ects. 3 More importantly, our model shows that di¤erent facets of globalization may have di¤erent implications for taxation. In particular, it suggests that trade liberalization and capital market 2 We focus on inequality here while Rodrik (1998) provides a model where globalization increases volatility. See Rodrik (2018) for a recent discussion of these issues.
3 Rodrik (1998) does model the two e¤ects formally. The di¤erence from Rodrik (1998) is that while in his model, compensation is in the form of insurance against risk, in our case it is redistribution. So, the models are complementary and talk about two di¤erent roles of the welfare state: insurance and redistribution.
openness could have di¤erent e¤ects on taxation depending on a country's comparative advantage and whether the country experiences in ‡ows or out ‡ows of capital. Also, the median voter model that we use highlights the role of inequality in determining the impact of globalization on taxation.
Empirically, we study the relationship between globalization and taxation using a large cross-country panel data set. Unlike previous studies on globalization and taxation which have focused mainly on the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, our data set includes 155 countries, including many developing countries which have undertaken capital account liberalization in the last couple of decades.
Our data on taxation comes from the Economic Freedom Dataset of the Fraser Institute (see Gwartney et al. 4 . The results using measures of capital account liberalization are signi…cant for the whole period as well as the sub-sample excluding the post-…nancial crisis years. Testing if the impact of globalization on taxation depends on inequality, we do not …nd signi…cant results. Finally, if the impact of capital market liberalization di¤ers across capital importing and capital exporting countries. We …nd that our de jure measures of capital account liberalization are negatively and signi…cantly related with taxation in both capital importing and capital exporting countries. There is some evidence that the tax reducing e¤ect of capital account liberalization is stronger in capital importing countries than capital exporting countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a brief summary of the related literature. Section 3 provides the theoretical model and section 4 provides empirical results. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 4 For the whole period this measure just fails to be statistically signi…cant at 10%.
Related Literature
Our theoretical model is related to the enormous tax competition literature surveyed in Keen and Konrad (2013) . While this literature focuses on the strategic interaction between countries in setting taxes in a world with free capital mobility, we use a small open economy setting with imperfect mobility of capital. Our modeling of imperfect capital mobility is similar to that in Persson and Tabellini (1992) who construct a theoretical model to study the implications of European integration for taxation. They assume a convex cost of investing abroad so that even if the net returns abroad are higher, not all capital is invested abroad. Most papers in this literature derive optimal taxation by maximizing the welfare of a representative individual but Lockwood and Markis (2006) use a median voter approach to show that it is possible for the tax rate preferred by the median voter to increase with capital market integration than in a closed economy. To obtain this result they assume heterogeneous preferences for public goods as well as heterogeneous distribution of endowments. This gives rise to the possibility that the median voter after capital market integration has a stronger preference for public goods than the median voter in the closed economy. 5 Another paper showing the possibility of the tax rate increasing upon capital market integration is Lai (2010) . This paper introduces lobbying by capital owners and shows that the lobbying incentives of capital owners for a lower tax goes down upon capital market integration compared to that in the closed economy.
Also, while the main purpose of taxation in the tax competition literature is public goods provision, the motive in our model is redistribution. Since there is no heterogeneity among individuals in the standard tax competition models, the question of redistribution does not arise. In contrast, in our model the sole purpose of taxation is redistribution.
To sum up, the standard tax competition models have a single good and therefore are not suitable for studying trade liberalization. Also, they assume perfect mobility of capital which is not suitable for studying incremental capital account liberalization. Finally, they assume the purpose of taxation is to …nance a public good, and therefore, the compensation e¤ect of globalization cannot be discussed. We construct a framework with multiple goods, imperfect mobility of capital, and a redistributive motive for taxation, that allows us to study the implications of trade liberalization and capital market liberalization on redistributive taxation when the tax rate is determined by a majoritarian government. The results on the implications of trade liberalization for taxation and how they depend on the capital-labor ratio of the country are novel.
As far as the empirical literature is concerned, an early in ‡uential work is Rodrik (1997) which studies the impact of trade openness (measured as trade-GDP ratio) on the Average E¤ective Tax Rate (AETR hereafter) 5 Also see Poutvaara (2011) for a model where the expansion of higher education, through an educational subsidy, changes the identity of the median voter and thereby constrains future taxation and redistribution. He also shows that allowing international migration in this setting lowers the tax rate chosen by the median voter.
in a panel of 18 OECD countries over the period 1965-1991 and …nds a negative relationship. Several subsequent papers have studied the relationship between globalization and taxation using alternative measures of globalization as well as taxation. Schulze and Ursprung (1999) provide an excellent survey of the early literature.
More recently, Adam et al. (2013) provide a nice meta study of the research on capital taxation and globalization. Their key …nding is that study characteristics related to the way capital taxation is measured (e¤ective tax rate or statutory tax rate) do not exert any systematic impact on the results, but the study characteristics related to the measure of globalization used is a key determinant of the relationship between globalization and capital tax rates. 6 In particular, studies using either trade-GDP ratio or the globalization index developed by Quinn (1997) Exbrayat (2017) adds a twist to the standard tax competition literature by using insights from the economic 6 They also point out that studies using tax revenues instead of tax rates generally …nd a positive relationship between globalization and taxation, however, tax revenues con ‡ate the tax rate and the tax base. Revenues can grow with an unchanged tax rate if the tax base grows. Therefore, we do not discuss studies that use tax revenue as a dependent variable. 7 Some studies test the impact of globalization on direct redistributive outcomes. For example, using a sample of OECD countries 
Theoretical Model
The theoretical model that we develop below has a Heckscher-Ohlin structure in the sense that the pattern of comparative advantage is determined by endowment di¤erences across countries. Even though the original 8 See Portrafke (2015) for a survey of studies using the KOF index of globalization. 9 We do not consider an important facet of globalization, which is immigration. See the interesting paper by O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) on the economic and non-economic determinants of attitudes towards immigration using a cross-country survey data. and labor. The two intermediates are assembled into a non-traded …nal good which is taken as the numeraire.
Everyone consumes the …nal good and the utility function is linear in the consumption of the …nal good. To keep things simple assume that X is produced using only labor while Y is produced using only capital with the following production functions:
There are N individuals in the economy. Individual-i owns k i units of capital and endogenously decides how much labor, l i ; to supply. The total amount of capital is K = P N i=1 k i and the total supply of labor is L = P N i=1 l i : The non-traded …nal good Z is produced using the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
Denote the price of good-i by p i : We choose the non-traded …nal good, Z; as the numeraire: p z = 1: Given the above production function and competitive markets for all goods, we get
If we know the price ratio for the intermediate goods, Denoting the real wage (in terms of the numeraire) by w and the real rental of capital by r; competitive factor markets imply
Hence, for a given py px , w and r are determined from above. Each …nal good producer takes the prices of intermediate goods as given. The demand for the two intermediate goods can be easily derived from (2) as follows.
where subscript d denotes demand. The above demand functions imply the following relative demand for the
If the country is in autarky (no trade or capital mobility), then the full employment of the two factors of production implies the following relative supply of the intermediate good Y .
where subscript s denotes supply. The autarky relative price py px is obtained by
The real prices, p x and p y , are determined by (3), which in turn determine the factor prices r and w according to (4) .
We are going to discuss two facets of globalization: trade liberalization and capital mobility. Trade in the model is going to be trade in intermediate goods, X and Y . As is clear from (8) : Then the real prices, p x ; p y will be determined from (3) and the factor prices from (4). Verify from (3) that the real price p x decreases while p y increases. It immediately follows from (4) that r increases and w decreases. We capture these e¤ects by using the notation r( ) and w( ) and for a capital abundant country we get r 0 ( ) < 0 and w 0 ( ) > 0:
Similarly, in a labor abundant country, we will have Turning to capital mobility, capital owners can invest their capital domestically and earn a return of r (before taxes) or invest abroad and earn a return of r f net of any foreign taxes paid. All taxation of capital income is source based as is common in practice. That is, the capital income can be taxed only in the country where it is used. Given the enforcement problems associated with residence based taxation of capital income, this is a reasonable assumption. The model economy imposes a proportional tax of t on all income and engages in redistribution. Given the domestic tax rate, t, the net return from investing capital domestically is (1 t)r. So, if r f > (1 t)r, capital owners would want to invest abroad. If investing abroad is costless (as is assumed in the tax competition literature), then if r f > (1 t)r all capital is invested abroad and therefore, equilibrium must involve r f = (1 t)r. We assume instead that it is costly to invest abroad. In particular, there is a convex cost of investing capital abroad (similar to Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Sorensen (2004)). That is, if an individual with a total amount of capital k invests k f abroad, the cost of investment abroad is While we develop the case of a capital exporting country in the text, the case of a capital importing country is discussed in the appendix. That is, we implicitly assume that we are in the range of parameters where the inequality r f > (1 t)r is satis…ed. 14 The logic of the Heckscher-Ohlin model would suggest that if a country is capital abundant, then the returns to capital should be lower than abroad and hence there should be capital out ‡ows from this country. However, there could be capital out ‡ows even from a labor abundant country in a world where countries have di¤erent technologies. To see this possibility in a simple way, assume that countries have di¤erent A z in (2). Now, even if a country is labor abundant, the returns to capital, r, could be less than abroad due to lower productivity. That is, for a given world relative price py px , p x and p y both would be lower in a low A z country and consequently both w and r would be lower as well. 15 A broader point is that trade liberalization doesn't necessarily equalize factor prices despite our extreme factor intensity assumption because productivities (captured by A i ) di¤er across countries.
The tax rate in the economy is determined as in a standard median voter model. The model is solved in two stages. In the …rst stage the tax rate is determined by the preferred tax rate of the median voter. In the second stage decisions regarding labor supply and investing capital abroad are made taking the tax rate as given.
The tax proceeds are redistributed to individuals in a lump sum fashion: Each individual receives a lump sum transfer of g: So, the only purpose of taxation in the model is redistribution. 16 In the absence of capital mobility, the optimal tax rate balances the desire for redistribution against the cost of redistribution arising from the distortion of labor supply. It is assumed that individuals experience disutility from labor supply, l; and the disutility is modeled as a convex function: 1 l where > 1. With capital mobility, higher taxes can give rise to capital ‡ight, which puts an additional constraint on the tax rate.
Below we discuss the model in general terms with capital mobility and later we will discuss the case of trade liberalization without capital mobility by shutting down capital ‡ows.
We …rst discuss the second stage problem where knowing the tax rate individuals decide on their labor supply as well as how much capital to invest domestically and how much to invest abroad. An individual with capital k i decides what fraction, s, to invest abroad so that the remaining fraction 1 s is invested domestically. The individual maximizes the expression below in the second stage taking t and g as given.
M ax
The …rst order condition with respect to l yields
Verify from (10) that dl dt
That is, a higher tax rate distorts labor supply.
The …rst order condition with respect to s yields (assuming an interior solution, 0 < s < 1)
Our assumption on the cost of investing abroad ensures that s is independent of k i which keeps the model simple.
That is, all individuals invest the same fraction of their capital abroad. Given the cost of investment abroad, an 1 5 See Tre ‡er (1993) for evidence on lower returns to both labor and capital in developing countries. More generally, he shows that allowing for such productivity di¤erences across countries helps explain the variation in international factor prices. investor would invest abroad only if r f > (1 t)r; which we assume to be the case. Equation (12) also implies
That is, the higher the domestic tax rate, t; the greater the investment abroad and the higher the barriers to capital mobility, ; the lower the investment abroad. Since each individual invests the same fraction of capital stock abroad and chooses the same amount of labor to supply, the transfer per individual g can be written as
where N wl + r(1 s)K is the tax base and k = K=N is the average capital stock per person. The amount of capital owned by the median voter is denoted by k m :
Now, the preferred tax rate of the median voter is obtained by the following maximization
The …rst order condition for the optimal choice of t of the median voter (using the envelope condition that the individual chooses l and s optimally in the second stage) is given by
Next, substituting out dl dt using (11) and ds dt using (13) obtain
The above determines the optimal choice of t for the median voter: The …rst term on the left hand side above is the marginal bene…t from taxation which comes from redistribution and is proportional to the gap between the average capital and the capital of the median voter. The next two terms capture the marginal cost of taxation due to a distortion in the labor supply and capital ‡ight. The higher the wage the more responsive the labor supply is to taxation, dl dt > 0; and hence the greater the marginal cost of taxation. Similarly, the response of capital ‡ight to taxation, ds dt ; depends positively on the domestic return to capital, r; and negatively on the cost of capital mobility, :
If the country did not allow capital mobility then s = 0 in (9), and hence the optimal choice of t for the median voter is given by the solution to the following equation.
The second order condition for the optimal choice problem of the median voter to be concave in the no capital mobility case is 1 1
Below we use the following de…nition to reduce notational clutter.
Therefore, the second order condition is > 0 which is true i¤ t < 1: This condition is trivially satis…ed for following them we will assume that the condition t < 1 is always satis…ed.
The second order condition in the case of capital mobility is
Note that if (19) is satis…ed, then (21) is satis…ed as well. Therefore, > 0 is a su¢ cient condition for the inequality in (21) to be true.
Impact of trade liberalization on taxation
Let us …rst discuss the case when the country prevents capital mobility. In this case, the optimal choice of t for the median voter is given by (18) . As discussed earlier, the trade barriers are captured by a parameter and trade liberalization is captured by a decrease in : With this in mind, and denoting by t m the optimal choice of t of the median voter, using (18) obtain the following expression for the impact of trade liberalization on t m :
The expression on the left hand side above is positive from the second order condition (19) . Now, in a capital (labor) abundant country, r 0 ( ) < (>)0 and w 0 ( ) > (<)0, therefore, the expression on the right-hand-side in (22) is negative (positive), and hence
Intuitively, since trade liberalization in a capital abundant country increases inequality, it increases the demand for redistribution. Hence the redistributive taxation increases. If there is no capital mobility, this is the only e¤ect of trade liberalization which is captured in (22) . Another way to understand the intuition is that the marginal bene…t of taxation, r k k m ; increases because trade liberalization increases r while the marginal cost, Let us re-write it as
As mentioned before, the term on the left hand side above captures the marginal bene…t of taxation. This increases unambiguously after trade liberalization in a capital abundant country because r increases and consequently, s decreases. The two terms on the right-hand-side capture the marginal cost. The second term is same as in the case of no capital mobility and because the wage decreases, a taxation causes a smaller distortion in the labor market, and therefore, the marginal cost of taxation decreases with globalization. The …rst term on the right-hand-side captures the marginal cost of taxation due to capital ‡ight and this is increasing in r because ds dt is increasing in r: Therefore, while the marginal bene…t from taxation increases unambiguously, the impact on the marginal cost is ambiguous. The results for a capital importing country are derived in the appendix and there we …nd the same ambiguity as in the case of a capital exporting country. Even though the results are theoretically ambiguous, from the inspection of the expressions in the appendix it is apparent that in order for the results discussed for the case of no capital mobility to be overturned, capital ‡ows must be extremely highly responsive to taxes. We con…rm this using a numerical exercise where we couldn't …nd cases with opposite results. The pattern discussed in the numerical example below is robust to changing the parametric con…guration. 
Impact of capital market openness on taxation
Next, we look at the impact of a change in on redistributive taxation. Taking the derivative of (17) 
The result above implies that a reduction in leads to a lower redistributive taxation. That is, an increase in capital mobility reduces redistributive taxation. To see the intuition, look again at the expression in (23) . A decrease in reduces the marginal bene…t from taxation because it increases s which reduces the amount of capital left at home which can be taxed. The marginal cost of taxation increases because ds dt is decreasing in : That is, at a lower ; capital out ‡ows become more sensitive to taxes.
The case of the capital importing country is discussed in the appendix. In that case, it is shown that a decrease in the cost of capital ‡ows increases the marginal bene…t as well as the marginal cost of taxation. The marginal bene…t increases because a decrease in causes the capital in ‡ows to be larger which increases the tax base. The marginal cost increases because the tax base becomes more responsive. It is shown that the latter e¤ect dominates if the elasticity of capital ‡ows with respect to the tax rate exceeds unity. Desai (2008) reports that the elasticity of foreign assets with respect to taxes is 1:6. So, a reduction in is likely to reduce taxation even in a capital importing country. Intuitively, in a capital exporting country the possibility of greater capital ‡ight constrains taxation while in a capital importing country the possibility of smaller capital in ‡ows constrains taxation.
We summarize the results on the relationship between taxation and capital market openness below.
Result 2: A reduction in the cost of capital ‡ows reduces redistributive taxation unambiguously in the capital exporting countries. The same result obtains in the capital importing countries if the elasticity of capital ‡ows with respect to taxes exceeds unity and the opposite is true if the elasticity of capital ‡ows with respect to taxes is less than unity.
Empirical Implications
Note from expressions (22) and (24) that the implications of trade liberalization as well as capital market openness depend on k k m which can be thought of as a measure of inequality. In the empirical exercise we attempt to test the following predictions of the model.
1. Tax rate is likely to increase with trade liberalization in a capital abundant country and decrease with trade liberalization in a labor abundant country.
2. Capital market openness is likely to reduce taxation in both capital importing and capital exporting countries. Recall that the result for the capital importing countries depended on the elasticity of capital in ‡ows with respect to taxes exceeding one. We will test this by seeing if increased capital mobility a¤ects taxation di¤erentially in capital exporting and capital importing countries.
3. The impacts of both trade liberalization and capital market openness on taxation depend on inequality.
One would expect the redistributive taxation to increase with inequality and the impact of globalization on taxation should depend on inequality.
Empirical Exercise
We …rst study the implications of trade liberalization where theory predicts the relationship between trade liberalization and taxation to be conditional upon the comparative advantage of the country as captured by its capital-labor ratio. To this end, we estimate equations of the following form.
where i denotes country, t denotes year, X it is a vector of controls, u i is the country …xed e¤ect and v t is the year …xed e¤ect. That is, we are going to rely on within country variation in estimating 1 and 3 ; our chief parameters of interest. 17 Theory predicts that trade liberalization is likely to increase taxation in a capital abundant country and decrease taxation in a labor abundant country. Therefore, we expect 1 < 0 and 3 > 0:
Our theory also predicts that the tax rate depends on inequality and the impact of globalization should depend on inequality. To test this, we estimate regressions of the following form.
We are going to use Gini coe¢ cient of income as our measure of inequality.
As far as capital market openness is concerned, the impact on capital exporting countries is unambiguous in theory, but for the capital importing countries the results depended on the elasticity of capital ‡ows with respect to taxes. Since this is an empirical issue, we test if the same relationship between taxation and capital market openness obtains for both capital exporting and capital importing countries. To this end we estimate the following regression for capital market openness.
where DK it is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for capital exporters and 0 for capital importers. A country is a capital exporter if it enjoys a current account surplus and a capital importer if it enjoys a current account de…cit. The existing literature has used both de jure and de facto measures of globalization to study the above relationship where de facto measures capture actual trade and capital ‡ows such as trade-GDP ratio while de jure measures capture policy changes. Sometimes de facto measures can serve as a proxy for de jure measures because the two tend to move together but de jure measures capture policy changes as well as technological changes reducing the cost of trade and investment ‡ows better and hence are closer to the theoretical model.
Also, de jure measures are less subject to the reverse causality problem that would arise with de facto measures if changes in tax rates a¤ect trade and capital ‡ows. Therefore, we are going to focus on de jure measures but to facilitate comparison with the existing literature, we provide estimates with de facto measures as well.
Data
Our dataset covers the period 1970 to 2015 and includes 155 countries. Our key dependent variable is an index of the top marginal income tax rate (TMITR) from the Economic Freedom Dataset of the Fraser Institute (see Gwartney et al. (2017) ). This index is based on the top marginal income tax rate in the country as well as the level of income at which the top tax rate becomes applicable. Therefore, in addition to capturing the statutory tax rate the index also has some information on the e¤ective tax burden. One thing to keep in mind while looking at the results is that these indexes run from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates "very high tax burden" and 10
indicates "very low tax burden". A higher number supposedly indicates greater economic freedom. Using the actual tax rates instead of the index for TMITR yields similar results.
Our main measure of trade liberalization is a de jure measure recently released as a component of the KOF globalization index (see Gygli et al. 2019 for details). This measure is constructed from three variables: non-tari¤ barriers and compliance cost, average tari¤ rates, and income from trade taxes as a percentage of total revenue.
We call this TLIB_dj_KOF. We also use a de facto measure of trade globalization from the KOF globalization index which is constructed using the world bank data on trade in goods and services as a percentage of GDP to which they add a measure of trade partner diversi…cation. We call this TLIB_df_KOF. Additionally, we use both the nominal trade openness and the real trade openness from the PWT version 9.0 (see Feenstra et al.
(2015)). The nominal trade openness is the nominal values of exports plus imports relative to nominal GDP.
The nominal openness measure is called TLIB_df_PWT. Following Alcala and Ciccone (2004), we also use the real trade openness which adjusts the trade-GDP ratio for the di¤erences in the prices of non-traded goods 18 .
In particular, we use the sum of shares of real exports in GDP and real imports in GDP provided by PWT, 9.0.
This variable is denoted by TLIB_df_Real.
We use 2 di¤erent de jure measures of capital market liberalization. Our …rst measure is the latest version 1 8 Due to higher productivity in manufacturing (or traded goods), rich countries tend to have a higher price of non-traded goods which tends to lower their trade-GDP ratio, when both trade and GDP are expressed in nominal terms, compared to poor countries. : 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 , and 2015. Table 1 provides summary statistics as well as data sources for the key variables. Table 2 
Empirical Results
We begin our empirical exercise by estimating equation (25) . Should we be worried about reverse causality?
One cannot deny the possibility of tax rates a¤ecting some of our measures of globalization. For example,
KOPEN_df_KOF which uses actual …nancial ‡ows can certainly be a¤ected by the tax rate. To minimize the reverse causality problem, we use the average values of the right-hand-side variables between the tax years. It is also possible that some time varying omitted variables a¤ect both the tax policy and the policies related to globalization. Our use of time varying controls such as per capita income and population partially addresses this issue but in the absence of any convincing instruments, we cannot claim to have established causality from globalization to taxation. We also use year …xed e¤ects to control for shocks common to all countries. As well, we use country …xed e¤ects to control for country-speci…c time invariant omitted factors. Therefore, our identi…cation comes from within-country variations in the variables of interest. Finally, we use robust standard errors clustered at the country level in each regression.
The …rst column in Table 3 uses TLIB_dj_KOF as the measure of trade liberalization. The coe¢ cient of TLIB_dj_KOF is positive while the coe¢ cient of its interaction with the capital-labor ratio is negative.
Both these coe¢ cients just fail to be statistically signi…cant at the 10% level having a p-value of 0:11: The two coe¢ cients together imply that the impact of trade liberalization on taxation depends on the capital-labor ratio.
In particular, as the capital-labor ratio increases, the marginal e¤ect of TLIB_dj_KOF on TMITR decreases from a positive value and for log_KL above 10:76 the marginal e¤ect becomes negative. For reference, the median of log_KL is 11:04 for the panel data set. Following Brambor et al. (2006) we plot the marginal e¤ect of TLIB_dj_KOF on TMITR for various levels of log_KL in Figure 3a . The results imply that when the capitallabor ratio is low, trade liberalization is positively related with TMITR or negatively related with taxation because the higher the tax rate the lower the TMITR which is an index. Conversely, when the log_KL exceeds 10:76, trade liberalization is positively related with taxation. Column V in Table 3 Figure 3c which con…rms that for high log_KL increased globalization increases taxation but for low log_KL the opposite is true.
While TLIB_dj_KOF is a de jure measure, columns II, III, and IV in Table 3 Columns VI-VIII in Table 3 Therefore, the results of the baseline regressions in Table 3 Even though the theoretical model does not predict that the impact of capital market openness on taxation should depend on the capital labor ratio, in Table 4 we run the same regressions that we did in tables 3, with the di¤erence that the measures of globalization related to capital market openness. The results are qualitatively similar to that in tables 3. It turns out that all 3 measures of capital account liberalization are positively and signi…cantly related with TMITR while their interactions with log_KL are negatively and signi…cantly related with TMITR. That is, even when we use capital market openness as our measure of globalization, we obtain the result that globalization is positively associated with taxation in capital abundant countries and negatively associated with taxation in labor abundant countries. Compared with trade liberalization, the cuto¤ capitallabor ratio above which capital market openness has a positive e¤ect on taxation is much higher. For example, comparing the KOF measure of de jure trade liberalization, TLIB_dj_KOF with the KOF measure of de jure capital market openness, KOPEN_dj_KOF (column I in Table 3 vs column II in Table 4 ), the cuto¤ log_KL in the former case is 10:56 while in the latter case it 13:13. For the other de jure measure of capital account liberalization, KOPEN_dj_CI the turning point occurs at log_KL = 12:35: Columns IV-VI in Table 4 repeat the regressions in columns I-III by excluding observations from the post-…nancial crisis years. The coe¢ cients of capital market liberalization variables are much larger in magnitude than in columns I-III as was the case in Table 3 . The marginal e¤ects of the two de jure measures of capital account liberalization are plotted in Figure   4 .
In our theoretical model, inequality played an important role in the determination of taxes. To see if our measure of inequality interacts with globalization in determining taxation, we estimated equation (26) using all 7 of our measures of globalization. For all measures of globalization we …nd the estimate of 1 to be positive and the estimate of 3 to be negative suggesting that trade liberalization increases taxation in high inequality (or high Gini) countries but decreases taxation in low inequality (or low Gini) countries. However, the coe¢ cients are less precisely measured and fail to be statistically signi…cant in most cases. To conserve space, we do not report these results in the paper.
Our theoretical model also suggested that the impact of capital account liberalization on taxation could vary depending on whether the country was capital importing or capital exporting. A country is a capital exporter if it has a current account surplus (CA_dummy = 1) and a capital importer if it has a current account de…cit (CA_dummy = 0). We use the interaction of CA_dummy with our measures of capital account liberalization in the regressions reported in Table 5 . Looking at the whole period (columns I-III) we …nd that the interaction coe¢ cient is always negative but statistically signi…cant in columns II and III. The direct coe¢ cients of the measures of capital market liberalization are positive in all 3 cases but signi…cant for the two de jure measures.
In Figure 5 we plot the marginal e¤ects of the two de jure measures of capital account liberalization on taxation.
As seen from Figures 5a and 5b, the marginal e¤ects are positive for both capital exporting and importing countries but larger in magnitude for the latter. That is, capital account liberalization reduces taxation more in capital importing countries. Columns IV-VI in Table 5 repeat the regressions in columns I-III by excluding the post-…nancial crisis years. The results are qualitatively similar to those for the whole period but the coe¢ cients are larger in magnitude. The marginal e¤ects for the de jure measures of capital account liberalization are plotted in Figures 5c and 5d . Again, the marginal e¤ects are positive for both capital importing and capital exporting countries, however, for the latter the 95% con…dence interval includes zero as well as some negative values suggesting that we cannot exclude the possibility of a non-negative relationship between taxation and capital market liberalization in capital exporting countries.
Robustness Checks
Below we discuss the results of some robustness exercises. To conserve space, these estimates are presented in online appendix. Tables C1, C2 , and C3 provide robustness exercises corresponding to the baseline regressions in tables 3-5, respectively. In Table C1 , we provide estimates for two measures of trade liberalization, The results in tables C1-C3 suggest that the baseline regressions in tables 3-5 are robust to the inclusion of these additional controls 19 .
In a recent paper Cervellati et al. (2018) …nd that there is a complementarity between democracy and globalization in adopting new technologies. We also ran regressions using the interaction of democracy with Our …nal robustness check is to see if the e¤ects of globalization on taxation are driven by particular regions by excluding one region at a time. More precisely, following the spirit of the empirical analyses in Rodrik (1998) and Gozgor and Ranjan (2017), we exclude the observations for the Sub-Saharan African, the Latin American and the Caribbean, and the developing East Asian countries, one region at a time. The results again are robust to the exclusion of these regions, one at a time and this implies that the baseline results are not dominated by the presence of observations from any speci…c region. One result that is worth pointing out is that the coe¢ cients of TLIB_dj_KOF and its interaction with log_KL failed to be statistically signi…cant in column I of Table 3 . 1 9 We also tried to include the political ideology of the executive as a control as was done in the studies of Angelopoulos et al. The exclusion of any of these regions makes these coe¢ cients statistically signi…cant as can be seen in column I of Table C1 .
Overall, robustness checks indicate that the results obtained in the baseline regressions in Tables 3-5 are robust to the inclusion of institutional controls, outliers, and the exclusion of various regions, one at a time.
Concluding Remarks
This Recall from the text that the …rst order condition for the optimal choice of t for the median voter is
Take the derivative with respect to to obtain
: Use this and re-organize above to obtain
Verify that I > 0 because > 0: III < 0 because w 0 > 0 in a capital abundant country. Also, r 0 < 0 in a capital abundant country. A su¢ cient condition to get the same result on the impact of trade liberalization as in the case without capital mobility is II > 0: The only term that causes ambiguity is
We resolve the ambiguity through numerical exercises.
Appendix B: Taxation with capital in ‡ows
Suppose we are in the range where r(1 t) > r f . In this case there is capital in ‡ow into the country. Denote the amount of capital in ‡ow by K I and use k I = K I N to capture the per capita capital in ‡ow. Assume the following functional form for k I .
That is, the capital in ‡ows are positively related to the net return and negatively related to the capital market openness parameter . Next, obtain the following useful expressions from (31) .
An individual maximizes the following objective function in the second stage.
The above optimization yields the same labor supply function as in the text given by
With capital in ‡ows, the amount of taxes collected per person, g; is
Putting the above expression in the median voter's welfare function
The …rst order condition for the preferred choice of t for the median voter is
The …rst term captures the marginal bene…t of taxation while the next two terms capture the marginal cost of taxation. Now taxing foreign capital bene…ts the median voter irrespective of his own capital. Bene…ts from taxing domestic capital on the other hand depend on his own capital holding relative to the average capital.
Note that dk I dt < 0 because higher taxes would reduce capital in ‡ows and therefore, taxation is costly because it reduces capital in ‡ows. Upon using the expression for dl dt from (34) and using the expression for dk I dt in (32) re-write the above as
Also, note that the second order condition for optimal t of the median voter in this case is given by
So, a su¢ cient condition for the inequality in (39) to be true is
Verify that f 0 > 0; f 00 < 0 is su¢ cient for the inequality in (40) to be true.
Impact of trade liberalization
As before, trade liberalization is modeled as a decrease in the non-tari¤ barriers, : Taking the derivative of (37) with respect to and re-organizing obtain r dk
Next, note from the functional form for (31) that
Substitute (42) in (41) to obtain
The coe¢ cient of 
Decrease in the cost of capital in ‡ows
Let us …nd how the tax preferred by the median voter changes with : Take the derivative of (38) with respect to to obtain dt
Next, use the expressions in (32) to re-write above as
The expression in the parentheses on the left hand side above is clearly positive. Therefore, the sign of
depends on the expression on the right-hand-side and hence a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
dt > 1 or the absolute value of the elasticity of capital in ‡ows with respect to taxes is greater than 1: To gain intuition, re-write (38) as
Now, a decrease in increases k I and therefore, the marginal bene…t of taxation increases. The marginal cost also increases because dk I dt = r f 0 which is re ‡ected in the …rst term on the right-hand-side of (46) increases.
That is, capital in ‡ows become more responsive to taxes. If the elasticity of capital in ‡ows with respect to taxes exceeds unity, then the marginal cost increases more and hence the tax rate preferred by the median voter decreases if decreases. 
